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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

and separation proceedings. The court, emphasizing the provisions
of 215-a, felt that the legislative intent was not to have a "coolingoff" period in separation cases.
The conflict between Cohen and other lower court cases has
now become academic. Sections 211 and 215-a of the Domestic
Relations Law have recently been amended to include all matrimonial actions
except an action to declare the nullity of a void
230
marriage.
Effective September 1, 1968, a complaint in a separation,
divorce, or annulment action may not be served until the expiration of 120 days from the date of service of the summons or the
expiration of conciliation proceedings, whichever period is less.
If the complaint in a separation action is in violation of section
2
211, will the summons also be dismissed? In Apploff v. Apploff, 31
a complaint in violation of section 211 was dismissed. The summons, however, defective because it did not bear the endorsement
notifying the defendant of the nature of the action as required
by section 232 232 was not dismissed. The court, on its own
motion, in light of the fact that defendant had notice of the
nature of the action and was represented by counsel, deemed the
summons amended nunc pro tun to the caption "Action for a
Separation." The court's action here was certainly in conformity
with modern practice; since the defendant had notice, nothing would
have been accomplished by dismissing the summons.
GENERAL MUNIcIPAL LAw

GML § 50-e: CPLR 2004 applied.
General Municipal Law section 50-e requires a 90 day notice
of claim before a suit may be commenced against a municipality.
Extensions may be granted in a limited number of cases, for
example, infant claims, deaths, or prejudicial reliance upon settlement representations.
Courts have been extremely rigorous233 in
enforcing the 90 day limit and have allowed few extensions.
230
Laws of 1968, ch. 701 amending section 211; Laws of 1968, ch. 706
amending 215-a.
231 55 Misc. 2d 781, 287 N.Y.S.2d 486 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968).
232 DRL Section 232 states, inter alia: "In an action to annul a marriage
or for divorce or for separation, if the complaint is not personally served
with the summons, the summons shall have legibly written or printed upon
the face thereof: 'Action to annul a marriage', 'Action to declare the nullity
of a void marriage', 'Action for a divorce', or 'Action for a separation', as
the case may be. A judgment shall not be rendered in favor of the
plaintiff upon the defendant's default in appearing or pleading, unless either
the summons and a copy of the complaint were personally delivered to the
defendant, or the copy of the summons delivered to the defendant, upon
personal service of the summons, or delivered to him without the state, or
published, pursuant to an order for that purpose, containing such notice."
233 E.g., Jefferson v. New York City Housing Authority, 24 App. Div. 2d
943, 265 N.Y.S.2d 336 (lst Dep't 1965); Payne v. Village of Horseheads,
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In Quintero v. Long Island Railroad,
the plaintiff, who had
suffered a double amputation in a railroad accident, did not file
a notice of claim within 90 days. However, the railroad had
immediately investigated the accident and plaintiff's counsel had
written to the railroad's insurer advising it of the accident and of
his retainer. Counsel also had served the railroad with a summons and complaint within 88 days of the accident. The supreme
court, Kings County, held that plaintiff was entitled to file a late
notice of claim and that the railroad was estopped from asserting
its defense of no notice.
The court pointed out that the Long Island Railroad was
neither a municipal nor a public benefit corporation for whose
benefit § 50-e was enacted, but rather a private stock corporation.
The railroad became entitled to a 90 day notice of claim by virtue
of an amendment adding subsection 6 to § 1276 of the Public
Authorities Law. The court termed this a "quiet" amendment
because its provision, that stock corporations of the Metropolitan
Transit Authority are to be subject to the provisions of General
Municipal Law section 50-e, applies only to the Long Island Railroad. In spite of the fact that the amendment applies exclusively
to the. Long Island Railroad, it is not specifically named in the
enactment. The court thus felt that notice to the bar of the
applicability of § 50-e was inadequate.
Recognizing that the purpose of the statute was to protect
municipalities against fraudulent or stale claims by providing an
opportunity for an early investigation of the facts and circumstances,
the court points out that the notice of claim is not intended to
be a statute of limitation. However, it has become one because
judges have not exercised their discretion in this area. A highly
worthwhile suggestion that CPLR 2004 235 be used to extend the
time to file the notice, when the court, in its discretion, deems it
proper, is made.
The decisions of the past, in so strictly enforcing the notice
of claim provision, have created injustice in many cases.236 In

21 App. Div. 2d 715, 249 N.Y.S.2d 550 (3d Dep't 1964); In re Daly, 19
App. Div. 2d 691, 241 N.Y.S.2d 732 (4th Dep't), aff'd, 14 N.Y.2d 574, 248
N.Y.S.2d 873 (1964).
234 55 Misc, 2d 813, 286 N.Y.S.2d 748 (Sup. Ct. Kings County 1968).

2 CPLR 2004 provides: "Except where otherwise expressly prescribed
by law, the court may extend the time fixed by any statute, rule or order
for doing any act, upon such terms as may be just and upon good cause
shown, whether the application for extension is made before or after the
expiration of the time fixed."

230See, e.g., Nori v..,City of Yonkers, 300 N.Y. 632, 90 N.E.2d 492 (1950):
Thompson v. City of -New York, 24 App. Div. 2d 427, 260 N.Y.S.2d 667

(1st Dep't 1965); In re Kreuzer, 282 App. Div. 881, 124 N.Y.S.2d 752

(2d Dep't 1953).
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addition to creating an injustice to the injured party, a malpractice
trap for lawyers has been created. For all concerned, the injured
parties, lawyers, and judges, the appellate courts would do well if
they applied CPLR 2004 so as to mitigate the undue burden of

§ 50-e.

NE-W YoR= IN suRANcE LAw

Ins. Law § 167: Party who abtained judgment in excess of policy
limits is not "'aggrieved" by insurer's refusal to settle within limits.
Section 167(b) of the Insurance Law, New York's "direct
action" statute, permits an injured party whose judgment against
the insured has remained unsatisfied for thirty days from notice
of entry of judgment to maintain an action against the insurer
under the terms of and within the policy limits.
In Browdy v.State-Wide Insrance Co.,237 the injured party,
who had obtained judgment for personal injuries against the insured in excess of the policy limits, brought an action against the
insurer for the entire amount of the judgment. The plaintiffs
contended that the insurance company had refused to settle in bad
faith. Special term, Queens County, held that the plaintiff could
not recover from the insurance company for refusal to settle within
the policy limits, because clearly he recovered more than he would
have had the company settled. Plaintiff was therefore not a "person aggrieved" by any improper conduct -on the insurer's part.
The court, however, did point out that the insured should be able
to assign his cause of action for refusal to settle.23 8 For example,
in partial payment of the judgment, the injured party could accept
the assigned cause of action against the insurer from the insured.
He could then sue the insurance company as the proper party
plaintiff.2

237 56 Misc. 2d 610, 289 N.Y.S.2d 711 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1968).

23

8Id. at 612-13, 289 N.Y.S2d at 714.

239 See, e.g., Lemons v. State Auto Mut. Ins. Co., 171 F. Supp. 92 (E.D.

Ky. 1959). For discussion of the New York rule on an insurance company's refusal to settle, see Note, Insurer's Liability for Refusal to Settle,
42 ST. JoHn's L. REv. 544 (1968).

